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1. Introduction
The ETUI has covered various aspects of the economic and financial crisis in
numerous publications. Valuable publications have touched upon plant-level
responses to the economic crisis (Glassner et al. (2009); government and trade
union responses in the financial sector (Glassner 2009); how institutions affect
labour market adjustment to the crisis in various EU countries (Leschke et al.
2010); the effect of the crisis in the public sector (Glassner 2010); and wages
in the crisis (O’Farrell 2010). This report focuses on labour law reforms in
various European countries either triggered by the crisis or introduced using
the crisis – falsely – as an excuse.1
In his address to the European Parliament on 14 September 2011, ILO
Director-General Juan Somovia stated: ‘Respect for fundamental principles
and rights at work is non-negotiable: not even in times of crisis when
questions of fairness abound. This is particularly important in countries
having to adopt austerity measures. We cannot use the crisis as an excuse to
disregard internationally agreed labour standards.’
At the G20 meeting of Labour and Employment Ministers on 26–27 September
2011 in Paris, promoting the effective application of social and labour rights
and ensuring respect for fundamental principles and rights at work also
constituted one of the key recommendations (G20 2011a) and was endorsed
in the Declaration of the G20 Heads of State adopted at the Summit in Cannes
on 3–4 November 2011 (G20 2011b).
Evidence shows that since the end of 2008, the start of the economic crisis,
public authorities and national legislators have taken a range of measures to
boost enterprise flexibility, including amendments to national labour law. In
some cases, general labour law reforms were initiated prior to the economic
crisis with the professed aim of ‘modernising’ labour law. In some countries,
such as Hungary, a change of government (shifting to the right) led to the
acceleration of drastic changes in labour law, even bypassing participatory
consultations with, among others, the social partners, in particular the trade
unions (for example, Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia). In other instances, these
structural reforms have been required or indeed forced upon these member
states by European and international institutions and organisations, such as
the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission and the
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1. For an overview of the ETUI’s work on the crisis, see also the ETUI website at
http://www.etui.org/Topics/Crisis
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the so-called ‘Troika’ (for example, in
Greece, Portugal and Spain where the reforms were ‘agreed upon’ between the
Troika and the respective governments in Memorandums of Understanding).
In addition, the European Union together with the IMF has undertaken
‘missions’ to European member states in economic difficulties. In 2010, for
example, they went to Latvia to discuss the 2011 budget with the government,
insisting that it include measures to deliver lasting deficit reduction, sufficient
to bring the general government deficit down below the programme’s 2011
ceiling of 6 per cent of GDP, while providing adequate funding for the social
and health safety nets, public works employment and job training to alleviate
the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable part of the population.2 The EU
and the IMF also organise reviews of the economic programmes of the member
states they financially support – such as Romania – in order to ‘solidify
economic growth while maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability’.
In this particular case – and among other requirements – the Romanian
government must commit itself to reducing its general budget deficit and to
reforming state-owned enterprises, including the sale of majority or minority
stakes in some companies and the introduction of professional private
management.3
Interestingly, the European Commission has not had recourse to labour law
and fundamental social rights to ascertain the maintenance of minimum social
standards; neither has it resorted to hard law mechanisms, although it has the
legislative competence to do so under the Treaty. On the contrary, the
European Union tends to follow its longstanding trend of calling for labour
market ‘flexibilisation’ (and labour law deregulation), as stated in a
Communication in 2010: ‘flexicurity policies are the best instrument to
modernise labour markets: they must be revisited and adapted to the post-
crisis context, in order to accelerate the pace of reform, reduce labour market
segmentation, support gender equality and make transitions pay’ (European
Commission 2010: 2). In addition, DG Financial and Economic Affairs stated
that ‘to avoid unnecessary and irreversible destruction of [human and
entrepreneurial] capital, … the EU [will take] the lead in developing guidelines
on the design of labour market policies during the crisis’ (European
Commission 2009: 2), thereby neglecting hard labour law. However, there is
no evidence that the financial and economic crisis is the result of labour law
provisions in the member states.
The labour law reforms currently being implemented in many Member States
are thus justified by the argument that making labour markets more flexible is
one of the best responses to the crisis (European Commission 2010). In some
countries it consists only of piecemeal although significant deregulatory
measures, while in others it involves far-reaching overhauls of the whole labour
code. Furthermore, in several countries fundamental changes are being made
Stefan Clauwaert and Isabelle Schömann
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2. See: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/2010-12-16-
staff-visit-latvia_en.htm
3. See: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/545
to industrial relations structures and processes which might jeopardise social
dialogue and collective bargaining there.
This report maps these labour law reforms in the various member states. The
principal objective is to survey and address the legal changes (reforms) being
made to labour law regulations in the Member States, which in most cases are
presented as necessary means to get out of the economic crisis. Such reforms
generally render existing labour law provisions more flexible and loosen
minimum standards, shifting the emphasis to soft law (deregulation). The
mapping presented here is far from exhaustive, for several reasons. First, it
deals only with certain labour law reforms and changes; for instance, it does
not consider other anti-crisis measures taken in many countries on (minimum)
wage setting/cutting, lowering or even cutting of social security and social
assistance protection and benefits, cuts in public services and so on. Second,
it deals mainly with developments between the start of 2010 and February
2012.4 Third, it does not touch upon all EU/EEA member states or candidate
countries.5 The latter is due mainly to information constraints, but also because
some countries, in accordance with their industrial relations traditions, put
less trust in the law and more in the social partners for reform of their labour
market systems, such as the Nordic countries. 
This Working Paper presents the main trends and tendencies based on a
country by country analysis. The country studies are regularly updated and can
be found at the ETUI website.6 The information used in this paper stems from
the following sources: (1) information provided to the ETUC by its affiliated
organisations, (2) so-called Memorandums of Understanding certain countries
have with the IMF, the EU and the ECB, and (3) other sources, such as the
Dublin Foundation’s EIROnline website (http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/
eiro/), other (electronic) newsletters (for example, www.planet.labour) and
academic articles. The most recent information is from 22 February 2012. 
By way of conclusion, the report critically addresses the large-scale
deregulation of labour law currently taking place in the European member
states, in particular the lack of democratic foundations underlying the reforms
and their negative impact on fundamental social rights and workers’
protection.
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4. An ETUI Policy Brief of 2012 mainly describes how the crisis affected social legislation in the
period 2008–2009 (Laulom et al. 2012). 
5. The report covers the following countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Particular attention is paid
to the countries that have signed so-called Memorandums of Understanding with the IMF, the
EU and the ECB to set up an Economic Adjustment Programme: Greece (May 2010 and February
2012), Ireland (December2010) and Portugal (May 2011).
6. http://www.etui.org/Topics/Social-dialogue-collective-bargaining/Social-legislation.
2. Main trends and tendencies
Looking at developments in the various countries, four main areas of labour
law changes or reforms can be identified. 
Fundamental changes to working time (I) and atypical employment (II) are
being made, mainly in response to the economic and financial crisis, although
such reforms tend to be temporary. There are also reforms of and changes to
rules on redundancy (for business reasons) (III) and industrial relations
structures and processes (IV), which affects social dialogue and collective
bargaining. These reforms tend to be (more) permanent. But whether such
changes consist of the overhaul of whole labour codes or piecemeal changes to
specific aspects and rules, they undermine the protective role of both individual
and collective labour law, thus putting workers in a more precarious and
unprotected situation both in general and in the workplace. From a democratic
perspective, the fifth trend is even more worrisome. In several countries (V)
reforms were introduced without recourse to democratic and participatory
(legislative) procedures, but rather using emergency procedures, bypassing
parliaments or the social partners. 
Table 1 provides a schematic overview of the four main areas in which change
and reform have taken place, based on the information collected for this report.
In the rest of this section, we try to clarify, by means of examples, the main
developments and measures in each area throughout Europe, including the
bypassing of democratic and participatory procedures. 
2.1 Working time
As already mentioned, a first set of changes are related to working time
(arrangements) in the broad sense. Overtime comes up very frequently. Several
countries have opted, for instance, to widen overtime options, sometimes
considerably. For instance, in the Czech Republic, plans are on the table to
increase permitted overtime to up to 416 hours per calendar year for managers
(now up to 150 hours) and up to 150 hours for other workers. In Hungary, the
annual limit of overtime was increased from 200 to 250 hours and even up to
300 hours if set by collective agreement. However, the former 200 hour limit
was applicable only to certain workers with so-called ‘special skills’: now, this
extended overtime option is available to all workers. Another major trend in
Hungarian labour law reform is decentralisation of collective bargaining, giving
a more prominent role to enterprise bargaining compared to national and
sectoral bargaining. In Lithuania, overtime was previously prohibited, except
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in some cases listed in the Labour Code or collective agreements, but in 2010
overtime rules were liberalised, permitting up to 120 hours a year or 180 hours
if agreed in collective agreements. Other countries, on the other hand, have
opted rather to change the rules on compensation for overtime in time-off or
in kind. As provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding between
Portugal and the ‘Troika’, draft legislation was introduced at the beginning of
2012 to amendment the Labour Code, thereby reducing additional pay for
overtime by 50 per cent: whereas at present employees are paid 50 per cent
extra for the first hour of overtime worked, 75 per cent extra for additional
hours and 100 per cent extra for overtime on holidays and Sundays, the rates
are now 25 per cent, 37.5 per cent and 50 per cent. Other foreseen amendments
are to put an end to compensatory time-off, which at present stands at 25 per
cent of overtime hours worked. It is possible to revise these norms upwards or
downwards by collective agreements.
The crisis and national labour law reforms
9WP 2012.04
Table 1 Changes announced and/or adopted to industrial relations/collective bargaining systems and
certain aspects of labour law
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece – MoU
Hungary
Italy
Ireland – MoU
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal – MoU
Romania
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Reform of industrial
relations and collective
bargaining systems
(including decentralisation
of collective bargaining)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Changes to
individual/collective
dismissal rules
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Changes to
organisation of
working time
legislation 
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Changes to rules on atypical
contracts (including creation
of new types of contract (+*)
in particular for young
people (+**)
+**
+**
+*
+
+**
+
+**
+**
+**
+
+
+**
+
+*
+
+/+**
+*
+* 
+/+**
+**
+
Note: MoU: countries with a Memorandum of Understanding with the EU, the IMF and the ECB.
Source: ETUI research.
A second popular measure taken or planned in several countries concerns the
extension of reference periods for calculating working time. In 2009, in the first
wave of its labour law reforms, the Hungarian government allowed employers
to set the reference period at four months (instead of three months) and even
to extend it to twelve months under certain circumstances by collective
agreement. In Poland, under the Anti-crisis law of 2009 reference periods could
even temporarily be extended – via company collective agreement – from three
to 12 months. With the expiry of this law at the end of 2011, the issue is again
on the table, with the employers’ side lobbying hard to make the 12-month
reference period a rule rather than a temporary exception. In Romania, new
Labour Code provisions set the reference period at four months (compared to
three previously) and in exceptional cases even allow reference periods of six
to 12 months. Other measures taken in the area of working time (arrangements)
concern the introduction of short-term working schemes, as in Poland where,
in particular, companies experiencing temporary financial difficulties are able
– for a maximum of six months – to reduce working time or even to put their
workers on (lower paid) ‘inactivity leave’ because of lack of work, as an
alternative to collective redundancies. Similarly, variants of ‘short-term working
schemes’ were introduced in several countries, including  Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, France, Germany and Spain. Such schemes differ considerably from
country to country with regard to duration of entitlement, workers covered and
so on (see also Glassner et al. 2009 and Glassner 2010).
It is well documented that working long or excessive hours has a serious impact
workers’ health and safety. After allowing further flexibilisation of working
time it might prove difficult to turn the clock back in future, even though these
measures are often intended to be only temporary. The fact that exceptions or
more flexible arrangements can be established only via collective agreement
provides a certain safeguard, but the ongoing trend of collective bargaining
decentralisation in many countries, with a preference for enterprise-level
bargaining, might mean that it turns out to be inadequate and easily bypassed.
Workers’ representatives might be faced with having to accept schemes with
longer working hours as an alternative to (collective) redundancies. 
2.2 Atypical contracts (fixed-term, part-time and
temporary agency work) and the introduction of
new types of contract
A second clear trend comprises efforts by many member states to render their
labour market more flexible by changing the rules governing atypical contracts. 
One popular means of doing so – despite the existence of a European Directive
whose main objective is to prevent the abuse of successive fixed-term contracts 7 –
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7. Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-
term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, OJ L 175, 10.7.1999, pp. 43–48.
seems to be to further flexibilise the rules on fixed-term contracts by extending
their maximum length. Examples include the Czech Republic (extension from
two to three years, with two renewals, yielding a total of nine years during which
one can be employed on a fixed-term contract by the same employer), Greece
(also from two to three years), Portugal (maximum length three years,
previously six months), Romania (maximum length increased from 24 to 36
months, with three successive fixed-term contracts: the first for a maximum of
36 months and the other two for 12 months each; previously three successive
contracts were allowed but with a total period of 24 months) and Spain (up to
three years, from none previously, and the possibility of an additional year by
collective agreement). Another option, besides increasing the maximum length
of the fixed-term work period, is to increase the maximum number of renewals
of such contracts. Examples include the Netherlands (successive fixed-term
contracts for young workers under 27 years of age become permanent after the
fifth contract instead of the fourth, as previously) and Poland (undefined
number of renewals but a worker can work only up to 18 months for the same
employer). Some countries have combined both measures, such as Slovakia,
where the maximum length of fixed-term employment is now three years
instead of two and three renewals are allowed over three years instead of the
previous two.
As for part-time work and measures to further ‘flexibilise’ it, in Spain the
reform programme of February 2012 has abolished a rule that had been in force
for about 15 years prohibiting standard overtime for those in part-time
employment. In addition to what Spanish law calls ‘horas complementarias’
(specific overtime for part-timers, subject to some formal requirements and
limitations – this form of overtime continues to be lawful), part-timers can now
work standard overtime (‘horas extraordinarias’) like any other employee. 
Other countries – including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece, Romania and
the United Kingdom – have opted to introduce or amend the regulations on
temporary agency work. However, this might be more due to the attempts of
the countries concerned to implement Directive 2008/104 on temporary agency
work (implementation deadline December 2011) and not only deregulatory
measures but in some instances more protective measures are involved.
Linked to this re-regulation of atypical contracts in several member states is
the creation of new types of contract. This would not be a problem in itself,
but these new contracts often offer less protection than normal employment
contracts and/or are targeted at specific groups of workers, such as young
people, who are already among the most vulnerable as regards labour market
entry, progress and retention. A typical example is Greece’s introduction of a
new ‘youth contract’. The idea is to hire young workers up to the age of 25 on
wages 20 per cent lower than the previous rate for first jobs, with a two-year
trial period, no social contributions for employers and no entitlement to
unemployment benefits at the end of the contract. In Spain, a new training and
dual education contract has been introduced for unskilled young people aged
25–30 (but with the possibility to extend it to persons aged up to 34), providing
considerable exemptions from social security contributions for employers both
The crisis and national labour law reforms
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during the contract and upon conversion of the contract into a normal,
permanent one. 
Apart from the immediate effect that this might have, leading to further labour
market segregation and exacerbating the position of vulnerable or precarious
workers, who experience serious difficulties in entering, progressing and
staying in the labour market, in some cases it is doubtful whether some of these
rules and contracts are compatible with European directives, in particular
those on fixed-term and part-time work. 
2.3 Redundancy rules
The global economic crisis has increased redundancies: job cuts are the
primary resort of private and public sector companies in reducing wage costs,
with cuts in working hours some way behind. This is particularly the case in
member states in which legal protection against (collective) dismissal is weak
(United Kingdom, Ireland).
Amendments to labour codes/labour regulations on collective and individual
redundancies aim mainly at simplifying hiring and dismissal rules (and
allowing large-scale recourse to atypical work). Three main areas of legislation
are involved, sometimes in combination: 
— Review of the definitions of (collective) redundancies and in particular the
notion of economic reasons for such redundancies allow more grounds for
dismissals, the idea being to enable undertakings to adapt better and more
quickly to the market changes (Czech Republic, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia,
United Kingdom); Conditions governing dismissals are softened and
thresholds are loosened in order to increase labour market flexibility, thus
giving enterprises greater autonomy in laying off workers (Estonia,
Greece, United Kingdom, Romania).
— Amendments to procedures governing (collective) redundancies are also
aimed at flexibilising existing regulations: dismissal procedures have been
made easier by reducing advance notice by 30 calendar days to between
two weeks and three months, depending on the length of the previous
employment contract, including notification (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania,
Slovakia, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom), and/or by allowing more
flexible layoffs in SMEs (United Kingdom), weakening employers’
obligation to inform and consult workers’ representatives (Spain) or
loosening third-party intervention procedures, such as recourse to
administrative authorisation (Estonia) or reducing employers’ obligation
to set up social plans (Romania, United Kingdom). Finally, access to
employment tribunals has been restricted in the United Kingdom.
— Amendments aimed at more flexible redundancy legislation also affect the
cost of layoffs, with a view to reducing the financial burden on
undertakings. Severance pay has been reduced (Czech Republic), eligibility
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and qualification periods have been amended to provide more scope for
firing workers, redundancy benefits have been reduced (Portugal, Spain)
and/or sanctions have been lightened (for example, replacing the sanction
of reintegration of employees after wrongful dismissal with financial
compensation alone). In addition, in some countries (United Kingdom)
charges have been introduced for appeals to employment tribunals.
Finally, public funds have been used to support enterprises laying off
employees by creating an ‘employers’ compensation fund’ to finance
redundancy benefits (for example, in Portugal).
In parallel with this, most labour law reforms have amended not only collective
rights pertaining to (collective) redundancy but also atypical work schemes
(such as fixed-term work contracts, temporary agency work and so on). This is
usually presented as a means of avoiding precariousness and maintaining
employment. However, the flexibilisation of employment protection law must
be regarded critically, in particular because it will create more (long-term)
unemployment and more precariousness on the labour market.
2.4 Changes to industrial relations and collective
bargaining systems
A clear policy and/or ambition can be identified in many countries to
decentralize collective bargaining, shifting from national/sectoral level to
company level. The professed aim is to give businesses more flexibility and
help them adjust to labour market conditions. Examples can be found in Italy,
Greece, Portugal and Spain. In Romania, the annual national collective
agreement has been abolished in favour of sectoral collective agreements. In
Finland, the decentralisation of bargaining has not proved effective and
employers have been encouraged to join the national collective agreement. 
Apart from shifting the onus to other levels, there is often the (additional)
problem of allowing lower-level bargaining outcomes to deviate unfavourably
from the protection provided by higher level collective agreements or even
statutory legislation. Such collective agreements in pejus deal, for instance,
with working time and wages. Examples of the latter can be found in France,
Greece, Italy and the Slovak Republic.
Another trend is the adoption of measures reviewing representativeness
criteria for social partners (for example, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal Romania, Slovakia and Spain) and extending what used
to be trade union prerogatives to other bodies of workers’ representation
(often at company level) (for example, Greece, Portugal and the Slovak
Republic).
There are also examples of countries – for example, Hungary – abolishing or
at least diminishing the role of certain (tripartite) social dialogue institutions,
with the government withdrawing from such bodies (for example, Romania).
The crisis and national labour law reforms
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Other labour law reforms tend to impose alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms instead of tribunals (Bulgaria, United Kingdom, Spain). In
Greece,8 arbitration must be triggered by the joint request of the parties and is
restricted to basic wage demands. In the United Kingdom, access to labour
tribunals has been restricted. Finally, the regulations on collective disputes
have been reviewed in some countries. 
These reforms of collective labour law will definitely weaken trade union
representation and action at all bargaining levels. They affect the very
structure of trade unions as well as their institutional means of protecting and
representing workers. Decentralisation of collective bargaining to the lowest
level weakens the social acquis achieved so far by the trade unions at national
and local level and will affect sectoral collective bargaining. It will also lower
the standard of rights recognised so far and anchored in legislation and
collective agreements, as well as affecting fundamental employment conditions
related to working time, pay, work organisation, working environment and
social protection. It will also have an impact on health and safety at work.
2.5 Lack of respect for democratic and participatory
foundations and procedures in passing the reforms 
Another striking characteristic of national reforms is the way in which the
drafting and hierarchy of social norms have been affected. For example, in
some cases, there has been recourse to ‘emergency procedures’ by national
legislators to bypass agreements on ‘anti-crisis’ measures agreed by the social
partners and/or prepared by national governments in consultation with the
social partners (Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia). In Greece and Italy, the
government bypassed the parliament. In Greece and Portugal, the national
authorities have had to implement the Memorandum of Understanding
imposed by the European Union, the IMF and the ECB to get access to the so-
called ‘financial rescue umbrella’, and thus without any consultation with the
national or European parliament. This, together with the reduction of the role
of social partners in drafting social legislation – in particular, the
decentralisation of collective bargaining and the new criteria applying to trade
union representation – represents an alteration of the procedures governing
social legislation at the expense of democracy. 
Furthermore, in some cases anti-crisis measures and labour law reforms affect
fundamental social rights, directly or indirectly. When looking at
Memorandums of Understanding, it is disturbing to read in the ‘social policy
chapter’ – for example, in the Greek Memorandum of Understanding of May
2010 on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality – that 
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8. As mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding of February 2012.
the government shall amend employment protection legislation to extend
the probationary period for new jobs to one year; reduce the overall level
of severance payments and ensure that the same severance payment
conditions apply to blue- and white-collar workers; raise the minimum
threshold for activation of rules on collective dismissals especially for
larger companies; and facilitate greater use of temporary contracts and
part-time work.9
Portugal’s Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy
Conditionality of May 2011 states in the section on ‘Employment protection
legislation’ (4.3) that 
the government will carry out reforms in the employment protection system
aimed at tackling labour market segmentation, fostering job creation, and
easing adjustment in the labour market: 4.4. Severance payments; 4.5
Definition of dismissals; 4.8 “organised decentralisation” (notably
concerning: (i) the possibility for works councils to negotiate functional and
geographical mobility conditions and working time arrangements).10
Furthermore, a number of national measures taken within the framework of
labour law reforms run counter to labour law principles, not least the principle
of trade union autonomy and trade union freedom (Spain, Greece), and even
the right to equality and non-discrimination (United Kingdom). Such
procedures call in question the legitimacy of the national reforms because the
lawfulness of the procedures (that is, their respect for democratic procedures)
has been marginalised and/or they violate fundamental rights and freedoms
at European level. Indeed, in Spain and Greece the trade unions have brought
a complaint before the ILO and the Council of Europe. 
Currently, the ‘first’ anti-crisis measures are under review and discussions are
taking place on the need to make temporary measures permanent (Germany,
Greece and Spain). In some cases, the positive impact of anti-crisis measures
is being questioned. In other cases, labour law reforms have been adopted with
no link – direct or indirect – to the economic and financial crisis, thus following
a deregulatory path. Parallel to the reform of collective labour law, we are
witnessing a widespread failure to implement information and consultation
procedures in the case of restructuring dismissals and without any
intervention by the European Commission (ETUC SDA 2011). 
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9. Memorandum of Understanding of 2 May 2010 between Greece and the EU, the IMF and the
ECB, p. 10. 
10. Memorandum of Understanding of 3 May 2011 between Portugal and the EU, the IMF and
the ECB, pp. 20–22.
3. Conclusions
The report demonstrates the major negative impact of labour law reforms on
workers’ rights and fundamental social rights under cover of the economic and
financial crisis. National reforms tend to deregulate already flexibilised labour
law regulations and thus in most cases represent a step backwards in terms of
workers’ protection. A recurrent feature of these labour law reforms and
flexibilisation is the explosive growth of inequalities and insecurity in most of
the countries concerned (Laulom et al. 2012: 5). Setting this alongside
measures affecting social security, such as pension reforms or public sector
reforms, reduction of job seekers benefits, salary cuts and so on, calls into
question the European concept of ‘quality employment’ and the international
concept of ‘decent work’, which national labour law reforms in Europe no
longer seem to meet. The meaning of the European social model is also
undermined. 
Furthermore, the report shows that in most cases the procedures do not
respect democratic traditions in the member states, thereby jeopardising the
reforms’ legitimacy. So far, however, only two national trade unions in Spain
and Greece have filed a complaint to the ILO that collective bargaining reforms
run counter to principles of trade union freedom and/or free collective
bargaining. Interestingly, the European Commission has not yet reacted to
measures violating fundamental rights of the kind guaranteed in the Treaty
and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. More worrying is the fact that the
EU, as party to the memorandum of understanding signed with Greece,
Ireland and Portugal and also as party to additional financial programmes
supporting European member states (Latvia, Romania) is putting so much
pressure on the member states to reform their labour law and social
protection, using the vague wording of the Treaty to support such reforms (see
Art. 122.2 TFEU). 
Labour law reforms tend to adjust labour regulations in the member states
designed to combat precarious employment, labour market segmentation and
a certain labour law rigidity, taking it for granted that these have a negative
impact on productivity and employment. The aim is therefore to flexibilise
labour law protections perceived as too complicated, too expensive and too
burdensome for enterprises. However, as pointed out in Finland during
negotiations on a national agreement in October 2011, it has not been proven
that such reforms – here, the decentralisation of collective bargaining – work.
Furthermore, the assumption that labour law reforms in Europe are needed to
exit from the crisis can be questioned, as it is difficult to distinguish whether
labour law reforms are a response to the economic crisis or merely accompany
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the crisis, with no certainty about any causal link between them.11 Indeed, at
present the reforms seem to be giving rise to increased precariousness but no
more employment. Labour law reforms supported by the European Union are
confirming the trend according to which quality employment is perceived as
being incompatible with competitiveness. This indirectly affects labour law
protection and emphasises economic freedoms, at the expense of democratic
traditions in Europe. 
There is clear evidence of a ‘deconstruction’ of labour law under the guise of
the economic crisis. Our hope is that, besides functioning as a mapping
exercise, bringing together information on the various reforms already
implemented or ongoing in the member states, this report may also serve as
an important warning signal and help to raise awareness among all relevant
actors and institutions of the fact that closer monitoring of these reforms is
necessary. The European trade union movement, in particular ETUC and its
affiliates, fears that some of them run counter to the countries’ obligations
under fundamental ILO, Council of Europe and EU norms and standards. In
fact, in some countries the trade unions have reacted not only by
demonstrating or organising general strikes but also by filing complaints to
the respective ILO and Council of Europe authorities concerning alleged
violations by these reforms (for example, Greece, Hungary and Slovakia). All
other relevant reforms should be scrutinised in relation to international and
European norms.
The ETUI will continue to conduct such monitoring, gather the necessary
information and review, amend and complement the information contained
in this report.
The crisis and national labour law reforms
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11. Valdés Dal Rés (2011) and Jeammeaud (1997).
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